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On October 8-9, 1987 in Washington, D.C., the National Institute
Committee of the Antitrust Section in cooperation with the ABA's Division for Professional Education presented a program entitled "The
Contested Merger." The Institute dramatized the hypothetical attempt
of soft drink industry leader Yankee Cola to acquire Cub Holdings, the
parent of rival soft drink manufacturer Dr. Soda.'
I. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The program began with meetings set in corporate offices, in which
the Yankee executives identified the business reasons behind the transaction, then consulted with in-house and outside counsel to assess the
deal's antitrust risks and structure it. The transcript of this lesson in
client counseling is reprinted following this introduction, as is the transcript of the panel discussion in which program participants offer a "reallife" analysis of the events of the program thus far.
The Institute program also dramatized the FTC investigation of the
proposed transation, from initial receipt and review of the Hart-ScottRodino filing, through company negotiations with FTC staff and Commissioners, to a Commission meeting that culminated in a decision to
seek to enjoin the acquisition in district court. The second day of the
program consisted of a mock trial of the FTC's preliminary injunction
complaint, featuring the direct and cross examination of fact witnesses
and economic experts.
II. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
In the carbonated soft drink industry created for this program, Yankee
Cola was the U.S. market leader, with a 28 percent market share. Its
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This program was based on the Federal Trade Commission's successful 1986 challenge
of Coca-Cola's acquisition of Dr Pepper. The facts in that case were modified by the program
committee so that they no longer necessarily reflect the state of the soft drink industry.
Similarly, the positions taken by program participants do not necessarily reflect the personal
views of those participants.
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brands included two colas, Yankee Cola and Yank Classic, and two brands
in the "pepper" flavor category, Cherry Yank and Mr. Pub. Dodger Cola,
with a 26 percent market share, was Yank's primary rival. Yank's acquisition of Dr. Soda would add 4 percent to the Yank market share
and raise the nationwide HHI over 200 points to a level above 1800. In
some midwestern cities, such as Chicago, Indianapolis, and Duluth, Yank's
market share would rise by 10 percent to 20 percent. Other than GingerUp, which earned an 8 percent market share from selling the leading
lemon-lime soft drink, no other firm had more than a 3 percent national
share.
The leading firms-such as Yankee, Dodger, and Dr. Soda-produced
soft drink concentrate or syrup, and uniformly contracted with local
bottlers to add carbonated water and distribute bottled soft drinks to
retailers. Soft drinks were marketed to consumers through three distribution channels: retail (primarily supermarket), vending, and fountain
(primarily fast food restaurant chain) sales. Bottlers were indispensable
for servicing vending machines and the most common way of servicing
fountain accounts. Bottlers worked with supermarkets to arrange promotional deals and negotiate for shelf space, but many small market
share brands such as Shasta and private labels were successfully distributed to grocery chains through food brokers employing warehouse ditribution.
III. ANTITRUST ISSUES RAISED
The fictional case raised a number of antitrust issues. The acquisition
produced a substantial increase in concentration in the highly concentrated nationwide carbonated soft drinks market, an obvious market
definition possibility. By the standards of the Department of Justice's
Merger Guidelines, the acquisition fell in the range where a government
challenge is deemed "likely." In consequence, Yankee suggested broadening the product market to include other beverages, such as coffee,
beer, and fruit juices. The government, not surprisingly, considered
demand substitution possibilities more limited than did the company.
Further, the government emphasized limitations on demand substitution
between soft drink flavors, noting that Dr. Soda's flagship product was
in direct competition with Yankee's Cherry Yank and Mr. Pub products
in the three-brand "pepper" or "cherry cola" flavor category. Although
the FTC did not argue for a flavor submarket, it alleged in its complaint
that the acquisition could substantially lessen competition by "eliminating
direct competition" between Yankee and Dr. Soda.
Yankee also attacked the inference of likelihood of future collusion
raised by the concentration figures, by attempting to demonstrate ease
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of entry into the soft drink industry. The contest on this issue concerned
access to distributors. Yankee maintained that bottler distribution was
unnecessary for successful entry, pointing to the many brands distributed
outside the bottler networks through food brokers and the availability
of beer wholesalers as potential distributors. The government contended
that only bottlers were able to cooperate on promotions and negotiate
shelf space with supermarket chains, and only bottlers were available to
service vending machines and restaurant accounts such as McDonald's.
In the alternative, Yankee argued that all soft drink bottlers had a strong
interest in adding new brands to increase volume, so new entrants could
readily find distribution through the existing bottler networks. In response, the FTC questioned whether a bottler presently beholden to
Yankee or Dodger for most of its volume would be willing to take on a
2
new brand directly competing with their primary supplier's brands.
The dispute over the significance of bottlers for distribution was particularly important because the government contended that Yankee's
control of Dr Soda would give it control of the "independent" bottler
(the bottler unaffiliated with either Yankee or its leading rival, Dodger)
in many regions of the country. With that control, the government believed, Yankee could raise distribution costs for the third important cola
brand (other than Yankee and Dodger), King Crown. The FTC believed
this practice could increase the likelihood of collusion among the two
leading firms. This was a potential "non-price predation" or "raising
rivals' costs" issue in the case.
Finally, Yankee argued that the fierce rivalry between it and Dodger
would make collusion impossible regardless of industry concentration.
The government disagreed, pointing out that a handful of firms, no
matter how rivalrous, necessarily recognize their interdependence.
IV. PROGRAM TRANSCRIPT
The antitrust issues, recognized early by Yankee counsel, are addressed
in the company's legal evaluation meeting and the panel's critique which
followed, the transcripts of which are printed below. Those issues remained important at every later step of the government's investigation
and trial. In the mock preliminary injunction hearing of the National
Institute's second day, Judge Miles W. Kirkpatrick issued the preliminary
injunction requested by the Federal Trade Commission.
2 Those familiar with the actual soft drink industry will recognize that bottlers in the
soft drink industry of the Institute program have not agreed to "flavor restrictions" in
their contracts with concentrate manufacturers. Under such clauses, a bottler agrees not
to sell the same flavor soft drink for more than one concentrate manufacturer.
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The Program Committee for this National Institute was chaired by
Caswell 0. Hobbs and Salem M. Katsh, and included Jonathan B. Baker,
David L. Roll, and Randolph W. Tritell. In the transcript below, Yankee's
CEO is played by Thomas B. Leary. Robert C. Weinbaum and Jonathan
B. Baker are the Vice President for Operations and Marketing respectively. In-house legal advice is provided by General Counsel Helene D.
Jaffe. Elroy H. Wolff is Yankee's regular outside counsel, and Malcolm
R. Pfunder is Hart-Scott-Rodino counsel.

